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Summary
In Europe, banks' business activities span the areas of banking, securities, and insurance. Various
regulatory features underpin these activities, the main one being the Second Banking Coordination
Directive enacted in 1989. The Directive was intended to create a level playing eld for bank compe-
tition by introducing a single banking license within the EU. This directive also laid the groundwork
for functional diversication of European banks. Since then, banks are allowed to operate broad
franchises, combining commercial banking, securities, insurance and other nancial activities in
one business entity. In subsequent years, this regulatory framework was extended with regulation
in areas such as investment services, insurance, capital adequacy and the prudential supervision of
nancial groups.
As a result of these regulatory changes, from the early 1990s onwards, European banks have
pursued a variety of different business strategies. Some European banks have opted to remain ac-
tive in traditional nancial intermediation, focusing on branch based lending and deposit-taking.
By contrast, other banks have diversied into investment banking, comparable to the situation in
the US where some of the large banks have set up investment banking subsidiaries. Several Eu-
ropean banks have pursued pan-European and global strategies in investment banking expanding
sometimes through acquisitions. The range of diversied nancial groups in Europe extends well
beyond investment banking. Since the early 1990s, a number of banks have opted for the so-called
bancassurance model, combining commercial banking and insurance activities, both underwriting
and distribution. Moreover, a large number of banks are also active in brokerage activities, asset
management, corporate nance, and venture capital. All these non-traditional activities generate
non-interest revenues in the form of fees, commission income or trading income.
The issue of how these different business models evolve is important to different groups of stake-
holders. A bank's management is concerned about how different revenue streams contribute to bank
protability, both in the short and long-term. Bank-shareholders are interested in this and a bank's
risk prole to the extent that it affects returns on their investment. Public authorities responsible
for promoting nancial stability are interested in how these developments inuence nancial system
stability. Therefore, Chapter 1 and 2 of this dissertation focus on how income diversity is related
to bank franchise value, bank risk in normal economic conditions as well as extreme movements in
banks' equity returns as a proxy for banking system stability.
This exclusive focus on the banking sector is warranted. Not only is the banking sector a par-
ticularly important sector for the stability of the nancial system (due to their interrelatedness with
other types of nancial intermediaries), banks occupy a central spot in every economy. They play
a central role in the money creation process and in the payment system. Moreover, by providing
loans they contribute to the nancing of investment and growth. Disruptions in the smooth function-
ing of the banking industry tend to exacerbate overall uctuations in output and banking crises are
associated with signicant output losses. Hence, preserving banking sector stability is of utmost im-
portance and the priority task of banking supervisors. While evidence on the relationships between
macro-economic conditions, regulatory variables and banking crises is more widespread, the results
in Chapter 1 and 2 may help regulators in understanding why some banks are better able to shelter
from the storm.
In Chapter 1, we investigate whether or not functionally diversied banks have a comparative
advantage in terms of long-term performance/risk prole compared to their specialized competitors.
To that end, we use market-based measures of return potential and bank risk. We calculate the fran-
chise value over time of European banks as a measure of their long-run performance potential. In
addition, we measure risk as both the systematic and the idiosyncratic risk sensitivities derived from
a bank stock return model. Finally, we analyze the return/risk trade-off implied in different func-
tional diversication strategies using a panel data analysis over the period 1989-2004. The effect of
diversication on market-based measures of performance (and the risk/return trade-off) is positive,
which implies that banks with a higher share of non-interest income in total income are perceived to
perform better in the long-run. Their franchise values, as measured by Tobin's Q ratio are positively
related to diversication. Hence, stock market investors anticipate that nancial conglomerates are
able to generate higher current and future prots. The nding of a revenue-based diversication ben-
et may be attributed to the fact that diversied European banks have a longer track record and have
committed sufcient operating and managerial resources to all these activities. More importantly,
this diversication of revenue streams from different nancial activities increases the systematic risk
of banks i.e., the stock prices of diversied banks are more sensitive to movements in a general stock
market index than non-diversied banks. However, the effect on the idiosyncratic risk and total risk
measure is non-linear and predominantly downward-sloping. This reects the main idea behind rev-
enue diversity: a combination of banking, insurance, and securities activities could lead to a more
stable revenue stream. This is because the revenues from different business lines in a conglomerate
are usually less than perfectly correlated. As a result, expanding banks' activities may reduce total
and idiosyncratic risk. To sum up, most of the available evidence identies relationships between
functional diversication and bank risk in normal economic conditions. However, it is not as clear
how diversied nancial institutions will behave in adverse economic situations and what the overall
impact of revenue diversication on banking sector stability is in these circumstances. We address
this issue in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 2, we analyze how banks' divergent strategies toward specialization and diversi-
cation of nancial activities affect their ability to shelter from adverse economic conditions. To
this end, market-based measures of banks' extreme systematic risk are generated, using techniques
developed for extreme value analysis. Extreme systematic risk captures the probability of a sharp
decline in a bank's stock price conditional on a crash in a market index. Subsequently, the impact
of non-interest income (and its components) on this risk measure is assessed. The estimation results
reveal that the heterogeneity in extreme bank risk can partially be attributed to differences in banks'
reliance on non-traditional banking activities. We establish that the shift to non-traditional banking
activities, which generate commission, trading and other non-interest income, increases banks' co-
crash probabilities and thus reduces banking system stability. Interest income is less risky than all
other revenue streams. However, the impact of the alternative revenue shares does not differ signi-
cantly from one another. The estimation results reveal that other indicators of bank specialization in
traditional intermediation corroborate the nding that traditional banking activities result in lower
extreme systematic risk. Banks with a higher interest margin or higher loans-to-asset ratio are per-
ceived to be less affected by extreme market shocks since higher values of these ratios reduce banks'
tail betas. There is both a direct and an indirect effect. The shift to non-traditional banking activities
has increased banks' systematic risk and as a consequence their tail beta, which causes an indirect
effect. However, there is also an additional and, on average, equally large effect of non-traditional
banking activities on banks' tail betas, after controlling for a bank's risk prole in normal economic
conditions. Hence, we can conclude that banks that protably focus on lending activities are less
prone to extreme systematic risk than diversied banks. This questions the usefulness of nancial
conglomeration as a risk diversication device, at least in times of stock market turmoil. In addi-
tion, smaller banks and well-capitalized banks are better able to withstand large adverse economic
conditions.
As mentioned before, the Second Banking Directive was intended to create a level playing eld
for bank competition by introducing a single banking license within the EU. In addition, the Eu-
ropean banking sector has been characterized by a number of profound changes over the last two
decades. Advances in technology, nancial liberalization, the ongoing economic integration and the
wave of bank mergers and acquisitions have affected the competitive environment, their operational
efciency and their ability to expand in other business lines. In chapter 3 and 4, we respectively
investigate whether these evolutions affect banks' long-run performance and their pricing policies.
In chapter 3, we analyze how stock market investors perceive the impact of competition and
efciency on banks' long-run performance. To that end, a modied Tobin's Q ratio is introduced
as a measure of a bank's franchise value. This measure is forward-looking, long-run oriented and
corrected for noise inherent in market valuations. This measure is applied to discriminate between
the Market Structure and Efcient-Structure hypotheses in a coherent forward-looking framework.
The long-run perspective and the modication of the performance measure overcome most of the
drawbacks associated with testing these hypotheses in a multi-country set-up. The Relative-Market-
Power hypothesis and the X-Efciency hypothesis are strongly supported, both economically and
statistically. That is, using a forward-looking market-based performance measure, we obtain that
market share may be a long-term generator of superior future bank prots rather than having imme-
diate impact on current protability. Moreover, a concentrated banking market does not impact all
banks equally. Rather, the interaction between concentration and market share is found to be a sig-
nicant driver of bank franchise value. Hence, based on the stock market assessment, large banks in
concentrated markets are judged to possess a superior long-run prot potential. On the other hand,
concentration may even harm the banks with the smallest market shares. Moreover, cost efcient
banks reap higher prots, now and in the future. Banks with superior management or production
technologies are valued higher by stock market investors. Since this effect is economically impor-
tant, banks have clear incentives to improve their level of productivity and efciency. Controlling
for bank risk in testing the market power hypotheses turns out to be important. Capital serves mul-
tiple purposes and the stock market appears to value two different strategies. More capital makes
banks less risky. On the other hand, higher leverage may create a better alignment between the in-
terests of managers and shareholders. Finally, the ndings are robust to controlling for differences
in regulation, supervision and the macroeconomic environment across the countries of the European
Union (EU15). Notwithstanding the international expansion of bank activities, the harmonization of
regulation and the macro-economic convergence, we still nd that country-specic macro-economic
variables have a signicant impact on bank performance. Our ndings indicate that there is a trade-
off between competition and stability that should be taken into account when assessing mergers or
acquisitions.
Finally, chapter 4 addresses competition, monetary transmission and banks' pricing policies. We
advocate a heterogeneous approach to measuring the pass-through from market interest rates to re-
tail bank interest rates and apply it to the Belgian banking market. We nd that heterogeneity is
substantial in retail interest rates. In contrast to what homogenous studies tend to nd, the incorpo-
ration of heterogeneity reveals that banks adjust their retail interest rates fast and incomplete. Hence,
the results suggest that the long-term pass-through is typically less than one-for-one, rejecting the
completeness hypothesis. A change in market interest rates is not entirely transmitted to banks'
retail interest rates. A substantial proportion of the heterogeneity in bank pricing policies can be
explained by the bank lending channel and the relative market power hypothesis. On the one hand,
we nd that banks with the largest market shares price their products least competitively, which is
supportive of Berger's (1995) relative market power hypothesis. On the other hand, both loan and
deposit prices of well capitalized and highly liquid banks are least responsive to changing market
conditions, as predicted by the bank lending channel. Hence, at the source of heterogeneity are
differences in banks' nancial structure and market power. On the bank asset side, corporate loans
are priced more competitively relative to consumer products. With respect to bank liabilities, the
interest rates of demand and savings deposits are very rigid, while this is far less the case for time
deposits and savings bonds. We also nd evidence of non-linearities in the speed of adjusting retail
interest rates. While there is no convincing evidence for asymmetry in retail rates, large deviations
from equilibrium mark-ups are faster reduced than small deviations. Specically, larger deviations
from equilibrium interest rates are more swiftly corrected. Moreover, while the speed of adjustment
for loans is relatively symmetric, deposit interest rates tend to be more rigid upwards. Banks are
quicker to revise their deposit rate downwards than upwards in response to changing market rates.
Although our approach is applied to the Belgian banking market, some of these results may pertain
to retail interest rate analysis more generally.
